A computational theory of world: Mind in Leibnizian metaphysics by Hastie, Natalie
1 
 
 
 
 
A Computational Theory of World: Mind in 
Leibnizian Metaphysics 
 
 
 
Natalie Hastie 
 
Student number: 30454393 
 
Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy with Honours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
STATEMENT OF PRESENTATION 
 
The thesis is presented for the Honours degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy at 
Murdoch University. 
 
 
2014 
 
 
I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains, as its main 
content, work that has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary 
educational institutions, including Murdoch. 
 
 
Signed: ______________________________________________ 
 
Full Name: ___________________________________________ 
 
Student Number: ______________________________________ 
 
Date: ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
COPYRIGHT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
  
I acknowledge that a copy of this thesis will be held at the Murdoch University Library.   
 
I understand that, under the provisions of s51.2 of the Copyright Act 1968, all or part of this 
thesis may be copied without infringement of copyright where such a reproduction is for 
the purposes of study and research.  
 
This statement does not signal any transfer of copyright away from the author. 
  
 
Signed: …………………………………………………………... 
 
 
 
 
Full Name of Degree: …………………………………………………………………... 
e.g. Bachelor of Science with Honours in Chemistry. 
 
 
 
Thesis Title:  …………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
   …………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
   …………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
Author:  …………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
Year:   ………………………………………………………………....... 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Computational theory of mind (CTM) is a dominant model found in much of the cognitive 
sciences and neuroscience, with the working assumption that most or all of mental 
phenomena can be reduced to computation. While this has demonstrated to be an effective 
working model within such disciplines, there are fundamental philosophical issues with this 
standard theory. By using a hybrid approach of Leibnizian Metaphysics as the ground on 
which to develop the emerging field of a computational Metaphysics, we can begin to 
reconcile this disciplinary gap and grant those fields the epistemic purchase that their 
assumptions are currently lacking. I will present first the primary concepts of CTM, and the 
problems which arise from this standard model in terms of understanding the nature of 
consciousness itself. By then backtracking into Leibniz’s Monadology, I will explore the 
rational foundation of his peculiar computational metaphysics that form his conception of 
the nature of ‘substance’. This will serve as a useful platform to explore the emerging fields 
of Computational Metaphysics, in which a number of recent theorists are proposing a 
paradigm shift away from the “myth of matter” to an informational model which seeks to 
account for physical structures of matter and motion in terms of computation. By 
combining these theories with Leibnizian metaphysics, in which perception and 
consciousness are not just explained but are intrinsic to his system, I propose a new, hybrid 
approach to computational theory of mind which is neither reductive to physical brain 
states and which accounts for the lived experience of consciousness. 
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Introduction 
 
It is the aim of this thesis to outline and explore the various theories of computational 
metaphysics using a Leibnizian conception of ‘substance’ in order to provide a 
metaphysical framework through which to account for human consciousness. The success 
of computational theory of mind outside of the discipline of philosophy, in the 
neurosciences and cognitive sciences, leads me to rethink the notion of consciousness. 
Standard computational theory of mind, which typically adheres to the tenets of 
physicalism, presents a challenge to explain the role of semantics and the lived experience 
of human consciousness arising from unthinking, mechanical processes. By explaining 
mental phenomena solely in terms of the operations of brain structures and chemical and 
electrical systems, we situate our understanding of mind into a materialist conception of the 
world. This is problematic given that our classical, Newtonian, physical picture of the 
world is devoid of any account for mental phenomena or the idea of the conscious observer. 
However, in recent years developments in theoretical physics, particularly quantum 
physics, have undermined materialist assumptions about the natural world. As such, our 
understanding of physical systems is changing. One of the emerging paradigms to explain 
physical phenomena in terms of information and computation, as opposed to the traditional 
matter and energy model, is distinctly reminiscent of Leibniz’s peculiar metaphysical 
scheme. Leibniz’s Monadology, in particular, provides us with a rationalist exploration of 
the notion of substance. His ideas about the nature of simple substances, monads, as 
“incorporeal automata”1 give us perhaps the first account of the world as being ultimately 
constituted by computational processes. Adhering to the Aristotelian notion of ‘substance’, 
                                                 
1
 G W Leibniz. GW Leibniz's Monadology: an edition for students. Ed. and commentary by 
Nicholas Rescher. Published by University of Pittsburgh. 1991/1714. §18. p.19 
8 
 
Leibniz’s monads are ontologically independent; their existence depends on no other thing 
than themselves. Using this notion, Leibniz conceived of a metaphysical system in which 
there are an infinite plurality of these monads, all of which are not only self-sufficient, but 
which contain within themselves all attributes which might be predicated of them; past, 
present and future. One of the core notions is that these substantial entities are necessarily 
incorporeal, without parts nor shape nor dimension, as any material conception of them 
would result in a dependency of such parts, thus undermining their ontological 
independence. As such, Leibniz denies them any physical interaction; the relationships 
between monads are ideal, they occur in perfect, mutual conformity with all other monads 
but are, themselves, the sole source for their internal states. These internal states contain 
within them their complex, coordinated relations to all other monads, which Leibniz called 
perception. The changes of these internal states are driven by what Leibniz called 
appetition, the algorithm contained within any given monad which determines the 
unfolding of its states. These two concepts, perception and appetition, are crucial for the 
development of computational metaphysics. And many current informational 
interpretations of Leibniz’s original text seek to understand these two features of monads, 
respectively, in terms of information and computation. 
One of the problems with computational metaphysics is that there is not, yet, a 
comprehensive, universally accepted account. As a proposed model for a paradigm shift, it 
is still a project that is in development by many theorists, not just in philosophy but in 
physics also. However, I believe that there is potential in exploring these ideas that may 
better account for the emergence of both life and mind from seemingly unthinking, 
mechanical processes.  
While there are many divergent theories, there are some commonalities between them 
that warrant exploration. While not all directly credit Leibniz, the ideas put forward reveal a 
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strong resemblance to his metaphysics. All of these theories accept the metaphysical 
position that the appearance of the processes of physical phenomena are, at their most 
fundamental level, the expressions of dynamics of information and computation. The term 
information, in this sense, is to be understood as the underlying mathematical geometric 
relations and qualitative properties of all the constituents of the physical world.  The 
support for this model cannot be proven through empirical evidence, since all investigations 
into physical phenomena occur in the phenomenal world. Rather, it relies on the efficiency 
of mathematical and computational models that are already being used to explain the 
physical world, and then extends those ideas to say that the ultimate nature of reality is 
computational. 
Most of my analysis will be focused not just on Leibniz’s original text, but on two 
theorists in particular that heavily rely on an informational and computational interpretation 
of the Monadology. Steinhart and Uchii advocate what they call “computational 
monadology" which draws from Leibniz’s concept of monads as the ultimate constituents 
of the physical, natural world. While they do provide differing interpretations, they stay 
true to most of the core principles of Leibniz’s scheme. Their accounts not only provide a 
current analysis of Leibnizian notion of substance in view of theoretical developments in 
physics, but also seek to explore the nature of space, time, motion and matter within a 
computational model of the world. In doing so, they also work to close the explanatory gap 
between living and non-living systems, and situate consciousness in relation to their 
corresponding physical bodies. 
By exploring these ideas I hope to provide a new account of computational theory of mind 
which is not reductive to physical brain states and the mechanics of matter. But rather that 
mental states are product the computational operations of soul-endowed monadic 
aggregates. As both mental and physical phenomena are explained as the expression of 
10 
 
complex, coordinated and unified monadic relations, the computational processes which 
produce mental states and events are not derived from non-living, mechanical systems. This 
is a metaphysical scheme which contains, in its most fundamental units, differing degrees 
of mental-like qualities, from which the properties of consciousness can emerge. In doing 
so, I hope to bridge the disciplinary gap between philosophy and the cognitive sciences, and 
provide the epistemic grounds on which a new computational theory of mind can develop. 
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Computational Theory of Mind: A Brief introduction into its Strengths 
and Limits 
 
Computational theory of mind (or CTM) is a dominant model found in much of the fields 
of cognitive science and neuroscience, with the working assumption that most, if not all, 
mental phenomena can be reduced to computation. Whilst there are many divergent and 
competing theses that use a computational model in an attempt to understand mental 
phenomena, there are some commonalities that fall under this, admittedly broad, 
understanding of CTM. 
 
These accounts typically adhere to a materialist doctrine, which then reduce all mental 
events to the physical, computational processes of the brain, drawing on the analogy of the 
human brain as a computer, or the physical hardware for consciousness. That is, the 
phenomena of mental events can be reduced to and described in both mechanical terms, 
such as the structures of the human brain; and in computational language, such as the 
information-processing capabilities and the manipulation of symbolic representations in the 
mind. Classical CTM is a variant of RTM (representational theory of mind), in which the 
symbolic representations have both semantic and syntactic properties
2
. This thesis has its 
roots in the works of Alan Turing who hypothesized his Turing Machine, which begins 
with its initial state, takes input in the form of symbols on a tape and then, through a 
specific set of rules or instructions, generates its output in the form of another symbol on 
the tape, leading to the TM’s next state3. This led some to equate the syntactic rules 
                                                 
2
 Steven Horst, "The Computational Theory of Mind" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. 
Edward Zalta. 2011. §1 
3
 Bijoy Boruah, “Computation and Cognition: Through the Philosophical Lense” 2006. p.72 
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followed by humans to the instructions stored on a computer, and the process of applying 
these rules to the computer’s process of executing its instructions. 
 
Central to understanding CTM is formalization, the notion of “formal symbol 
manipulation”, which arose from the works of mathematicians in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries to ground reasoning in rules and axioms with non-semantic properties. 
Computation is the process by which symbols can be encoded with semantic properties, 
allowing for inferences based solely on manipulations of those symbols in a manner that is 
receptive only to their syntactic properties
4
. The TM demonstrated that any operation that 
was sensitive to syntax, or non-semantic properties, could be simulated mechanically, as 
blind, rote computation. CTM also accounted for features of language such as systematicity 
and productivity. Systematicity is simply that a person who can understand the sentence 
“the dog chased the cat” will then also be able to understand the sentence “the cat chased 
the dog”. And productivity refers to the ability that, in mastering language, we are able to 
form an infinite number of thoughts from a finite set of syntactic rules and (what Chomsky 
called) “lexical primitives”5. 
 
The notion of computability began to take hold in the area of philosophy of mind to account 
for human reasoning, in particular, propositional attitudes. Jerry Fodor linked this classical 
CTM to his LOTH (language of thought hypothesis), where he saw cognitive 
representations in the mind as ‘tokens’; and propositional attitudes as the relations between 
the cognitive agent, the human being, to those tokens
6
. The neuroscientist David Marr used 
a computational approach to human vision using a hierarchy of three explanatory levels. At 
the highest level is the computational level, where the task specified by the system is 
                                                 
4
 Steven Horst, 2011, §1.1 
5
 Steven Horst, 2011, §2.3 
6
 Steven Horst, 2011, §2.2 
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performed. An intermediary level, where the system employs an algorithm, which is how 
the task is performed. And the lowest level, which involves the implementation of a 
function by the ‘hardware’ of a system; in this case it is the human brain. 
 
While this has demonstrated to be an effective working model within the disciplines of the 
cognitive sciences and neuroscience, there are fundamental philosophical issues with this 
standard model. The most well-known objections raised against computational theory of 
mind are Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment and the theory’s failure to adequately 
account for human intentionality and semantics
7
. The Chinese Room thought experiment is 
presented thusly: 
A human person takes on the role of a ‘machine’ in this scenario. They are locked inside a 
room with no communication to the outside world except through Chinese symbols, a 
language the person does not understand. Guided by a rulebook, which tells the person 
what symbols to write in response to those given, their task is to produce appropriate 
response, in Chinese symbols, to those symbols that they receive
8
. 
In this scenario the person may produce meaningful sentences but lacks what we would call 
any understanding of those sentences. This scenario is designed to mimic the conditions of 
a digital computer, which can receive symbolic input and generate symbolic output based 
on its specific set of instructions. The crux of Searle’s thought experiment is that one could, 
through blind rote processes, perfectly simulate human communication in a manner in 
which lacks any genuine understanding. This thought experiment can be applied to the 
notion of mental processes being described purely in computational terms; descriptions of 
the rules or algorithms governing mental processes strictly as syntactical relations cannot 
account for the crucial role of semantics in lived human experience.  
                                                 
7
 Steven Horst, 2011, §3.4 
8
 Steven Horst, 2011, §3.4 
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While there are significant problems with whether or not standard computational theory of 
mind can be sustained as a legitimate philosophical position, the benefits of the working 
model can be demonstrated outside the philosophical domain in the cognitive sciences. 
Rather than discarding computational theory of mind entirely, I propose a new, hybrid 
approach to computational theory of mind which is not reductive to physical brain states 
and which accounts for the lived experience of human consciousness. Rather, this thesis is 
intended to provide a metaphysical scheme in which a computational understanding of the 
mind is embedded in the fundamental units of the universe, as a cosmic computer. This 
approach combines the works of Leibniz, in particular his Monadology, and the works of 
theorists in the emerging field of digital philosophy, to explore the position of 
computational metaphysics and what consequences this view might have on how we 
understand the human mind. 
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The Monadology: The Original Computational Metaphysics 
 
Whilst Leibniz’s Monadology is not a complete account of his theory of metaphysics it 
does outline his theory of simple substances and how it fits into his broader metaphysical 
scheme. For Leibniz, as with his other17th century rational philosophers, the concept of 
‘substance’ is not just crucial to understanding his metaphysics, but is the ground on which 
his theory is built. The earlier sections of the Monadology provide us with a basic overview 
of the nature of his simple substances. 
In keeping with other rational philosophers, like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz begins 
with a definition of substance as something which has independent existence. In order for a 
substance to be as it is, as an ultimate constituent of reality, it must depend on no other 
thing, except God, for its own existence. This leads directly to the first section of Leibniz’s 
Monadology; in that a simple substance must have no parts
9. Leibniz’s metaphysics is 
diametrically opposed to atomism and other materialist positions, since for a substance to 
be an ultimate constituent, it must be indivisible, lacking parts, otherwise it would be 
dependent on those parts for its own existence
10. Leibniz’s issue with atomism here is that 
he believed all matter, all extended things, in nature are infinitely divisible. Simple 
substances have their simplicity in that they lack physical components in their make-up, 
they are quantitatively simple, incorporeal substances. Because simple substances lack 
parts, they also lack extension; as “true atoms” of nature they have  neither shape nor 
figure, they are immaterial
11
. Unlike any materialist doctrine, Leibniz conceived of the 
basic, underlying reality for all things which exist as bodiless and incorporeal in nature; that 
all physical things in the world, all matter and physical processes, are simply the expression 
                                                 
9
 Nicholas Rescher, “G. W. Leibniz's Monadology: An Edition for Students”. Published by Pittsburgh 
University Press. 1991 p.45 
10
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991 p.46 
11
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §3, p.17 
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of the basic ‘nature’ contained in these simple substances12. This leads us to understand that 
there are two levels of nature; the micro-level of individual simple substances, or monads, 
and the macro-level of composite matter, the world that we experience, which derives its 
reality solely from these simple substances
13
. 
Leibniz determined that while monads, as the most fundamental constituents of reality, 
are quantitatively simple they must also be qualitatively complex. According to the late 
Aristotelian tradition, a substance is defined as the subject of predication, which cannot 
itself be predicated of anything else
14
. Leibniz extended this definition further to form what 
is known as a ‘complete individual concept’. That is, each individual substance must have a 
concept so complete so as to contain all of the predicates which may be attributable to it, 
including those that are not currently expressed at any given moment
15
. This understanding 
of substances as having a complete concept ties into Leibniz’s statement in section 7 that 
monads have no ‘windows’. By this he means that, since monads are not material they 
cannot be physically influenced by any other thing, since physical interaction involves a 
transmission of parts
16
. So while monads are quantitatively simple and without parts, they 
are qualitatively complex in that they contain within them a complete individual concept, 
an “inner program”, which determines the unfolding of all of its inner states17. Monads 
have no ‘windows’, nothing external can affect its internal states, because all of a 
substance’s past, present, and future states are already contained within it as its complete 
concept
18
. 
                                                 
12
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.90 
13
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.51 
14
 Brandon C. Look, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward 
N. Zalta. 2014. §4 
15
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.61 
16
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §7, p.17 
17
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.59 
18
 Douglas Burnham, “Gottfried Leibniz: Metaphysics” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. §8.a 
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Unlike Descartes’ dualism, or Spinoza’s substance monism, Leibniz postulated an infinite 
plurality of these simple substances. Section 9 of the Monadology demonstrates his 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Simply put, this means that no two substances 
can be qualitatively identical to one another. A crucial feature of monads that will be 
discussed later, is that they all represent the entire universe from their own unique point of 
view
19
, no two monads can be completely identical in this respect. 
In these early sections Leibniz succinctly expresses a fundamentally different concept of 
substance than his predecessors. The physical world that we experience is one of ‘mere 
phenomena’; true reality lies in the substances of which the world of extension and space 
and time are derived from. There is an infinite plurality of simple substances, each 
indivisible and incorporeal but qualitatively complex, which is contained within each 
monad’s complete individual concept. 
A central feature to understanding this inner complexity of simple substances is the 
notion of change. Following on from the Complete Individual Concept, all states of a 
monad unfold from its own internal principle, which Leibniz calls ‘appetition’20. Simple 
substances, or monads, are not static entities, they are ever-changing in accordance with 
their internal principle
21
. In section 13, Leibniz writes: 
 
“This internal complexity (détail) must enfold a multiplicity in unity or in the 
simple. For as every natural change happens by degrees, something always 
changes and something remains. Consequently there must be a plurality of 
properties and relations within a simple substance, even though it has none of 
parts.”22 
                                                 
19
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §8, p.17 
20
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §11, p18 
21
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.67 
22
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §13, p.18 
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Leibniz demonstrates through this section that the simplicity of a monad is only a 
numerical simplicity, in that every simple substance constitutes a true unit and lacks parts. 
The internal complexity of a monad, however, is not static, but dynamic. Within each 
simple substance of its properties and relations to all other things which exist outside of it, 
and this multiplicity of properties within a substance’s complete concept is one which 
unfolds in a predetermined manner according to the substance’s internal program23. 
 
Physicalism is a doctrine which asserts that all mental states are the same as by physical 
states and processes, a position which Leibniz was firmly opposed to in the Monadology. 
An essential feature of monads is that they have perception, which is the set of determinate 
relations that any given monad has with all other monads in its proximate environment. 
These simple substances are endowed with some, limited, form of mentality which 
represents these complex relations. Leibniz demonstrated the insufficiency of mechanical 
explanations for perception in section 17 of the Monadology.  
 
“In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, 
to sense, and to have perceptions, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining 
the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like a windmill. 
Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one 
another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.”24 
 
That is to say that if we were to understand perception and mental processes as the result 
of physical and mechanical operations, then consciousness itself would not be explained. 
                                                 
23
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.74 
24
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §17, p.19 
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There would be nothing of those parts and motions that could account for the complexity 
and unity of perceptions, only further motions and parts. It is for this reason that Leibniz 
asserts that perception, and higher levels of consciousness, must be found within the simple 
substances themselves and not the composites which they form. 
Perception, for Leibniz, is the manner in which a simple substance, or monad, contains 
within itself a “mirror” of the rest of the universe within its own complete concept, as the 
representation of the many in the one
25. Each simple substance’s complete individual 
concept contains all of its relations to all other substances, some of which a substance 
perceives distinctly, but most of which it perceives only confusedly. Perception and 
appetition, the tendency to move from one perception towards another perception, are the 
essence of all simple substances. Appetition, which is the striving towards the next state in 
a monad, is described as “the action of the internal principle which brings about change”26. 
Since all perception states are determined in all monads at the moment of creation, this 
appetition then is also predetermined, following teleological law
27
. This internal principle 
of any given monad is then “programmed into its very nature as the individual it is”28. This 
unfolding of this internal program can then be understood as a monad, through its own 
internal algorithm, computing its next perceptual state
29
. 
As Since monads are ever-changing, passing from one perception to another in a 
continuous way, they must have a genuine substantial unity which unifies the manifold of 
perceptions contained within it
30
. While each monad contains a multiplicity of perceptions 
which reflect its complex relations to all other monads, they are all contained within a 
single substance’s complete individual concept, forming a single, unitary one. Physical 
                                                 
25
 Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta 1997 §4 
26
 G W Leibniz, 1991, §15, p.18 
27
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p,79 
28
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.81 
29
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.80 
30
 Brandon C. Look, 2014, §4.2 
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bodies, as composites, lack this necessary unity as they are divisible and dependent on 
parts, and as such are unfit for the role of substance
31
. Sections 13, 14 and 16 of the 
Monadology feature the notion of “multiplicity in unity”. That is to say that the 
continuously changing internal states, or perceptions, of monads are unified within it under 
a monad’s predetermined complete individual concept. 
While all simple substances have vitality or life-force, a degree of soul-like qualities, not 
all possess consciousness. Indeed, in representing the universe as a whole, even conscious 
beings like animals and humans mostly experience minute (petite) perceptions. These 
perceptions lie below the threshold of conscious awareness and, as such, are confused 
perceptions
32
. An example that Leibniz uses to demonstrate this is the act of consciously 
perceiving the sound of the ocean. The ‘roar’ of the sea is constituted by an infinite number 
of minute perceptions, parts which make up the whole, that, individually, are 
indistinguishable from the overall sound that we are consciously aware of
33
. All of the 
minute perceptions that would lie below the threshold of conscious awareness combine 
together to form a confused perception that is the roaring of the sea. However, while all 
monads are always engaged in perception, not all simple substances are capable of 
perceiving above this threshold of consciousness. 
Leibniz lays out a tripartite hierarchy of simple substances, from that which appears to be 
inanimate to human beings. At the lowest level are bare monads, which are only capable of 
unconscious perception and which have no memory or awareness. On the next tier are 
souls, which consist of some distinct perceptions and memory. Memory, for Leibniz, is the 
operation of a principle of association
34
, something which mimics the capacity for reason 
but which is not reason. This imitation of reason is carried out by an “automatic processes 
                                                 
31
 Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, 1997, §1 
32
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p,78 
33
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.54 
34
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.105 
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associative of thought-transition”, or, in computational terms, computing the next state 
based on previous state-transitions
35
.  
Animal sentience, and much of the processes of the human mind, function in this capacity 
as souls. Distinct perceptions are combined with the capacity for memory to form 
associations regarding the external world. For example, a dog may see a stick and cower or 
run away due to the memory of previous distinct perceptions in which the stick is now 
associated with pain of being struck
36
; or we may expect the sun to rise each morning 
simply because it has every other morning
37
. On this level, souls are capable of sensations 
and memory and so possess consciousness. 
On the highest level of this tripartite hierarchy are spirits, monads which possess not only 
memory and consciousness, but also self-reflexive awareness and reason
38
. Although much 
of the functions of human beings operate as would a mere soul, we also possess this higher 
capacity for self-awareness that Leibniz terms ‘apperception’. It is apperception that allows 
us to reflect on our inner states and perceptions, to think of the ‘I’, the multiplicity of 
perceptions in the single, unitary substance
39
. It is this apperception that allows us to come 
to know eternal truths through the application of reason and self-reflexive thinking
40
. Only 
those who possess a spirit monad are capable of mathematics and logic, inductive and 
deductive reasoning, and so are capable of both science and morality. 
It is significant to note here that this hierarchal model is one of difference by degrees, and 
not by kind. All monads, or simple substances, contain perceptions, the difference between 
a spirit substance and that of a bare monad is the distinctness and clarity of some of their 
perceptions, and the accompaniment of the capacity for memory. Even at the highest level, 
                                                 
35
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.105 
36
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §26, p.20 
37
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §28, p.20 
38
 Nicholas Rescher, 1991, p.92 
39
 Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, 1997, §5 
40
 G W Leibniz, 1714, §29, p.20 
22 
 
that of spirits, Leibniz takes care to establish that for the majority of our actions, we operate 
on the basis of memory, on the level of souls. We expect the sun to rise tomorrow because 
it always has, this association is not grounded in reason but only of experience without 
theory, only an astronomer or similar scientist would base their assertion that the sun will 
rise again tomorrow on the basis of higher order reason. Even human beings which have a 
spirit monad will sometimes experience perceptions on the level of a bare monad, such as 
in a swoon or dreamless sleep
41
. For Leibniz, perceptions can only come naturally from 
preceding perceptions, so during such a state it is not the case that we are not perceiving at 
all, but rather that we are not consciously aware of these perceptions. Leibniz understood 
all change to be continuous, rather than discreet, and so conscious and unconscious mental 
life must not be completely separate, instead bare perceptions are followed by more distinct 
perceptions, accompanied by reflexive self-awareness
42
. The difference between bare 
monads, souls and spirits is not one of a difference in kind, but rather the distinctness of 
perceptions contained within simple substances. 
 
 
By establishing the ultimate constituents of reality as being incorporeal, self-sufficient 
and as reflecting the entire universe in its perceptions, Leibniz set up a rather different 
metaphysical scheme than his contemporaries. In determining the ontological independence 
of simple substances in their complete individual concept, Leibniz denied the possibility of 
inter-substantial causality. The ‘windowless’ nature of monads is grounded in the self-
sufficiency of a simple substance for all of its internal states and a refutation of matter as a 
candidate for substance, since for one thing to effect change in another requires a 
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transmission of parts
43
. In section 22 of the Monadology, we start to develop a picture of 
the idea of harmony as regards simple substances in their complete individual concept. 
 
“As every present state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its 
preceding state, so is its present pregnant with the future.”44 
 
That is to say that each substance’s entire history, as contained in its complete concept, is 
predetermined from the moment of its creation. Since every internal state of a monad is a 
consequent of its antecedent states, at any moment in the unfolding of a monad’s internal 
nature it contains within it all of its previous states
45
. And just as it contains within its 
complete concept, a simple substance’s present state is ‘pregnant’ with its future states 
which come from the unfolding of a monad’s internal algorithmic “program” alone46. 
 
Leibniz developed the notion of “pre-established harmony’ to account for the nature of 
the relations between all simple substances whilst denying causality amongst things. All 
simple substances are programmed at creation in such a manner that all the unfolding states 
and actions of individual substances are in conformity with those of every other 
substance
47
. Section 51 of the Monadology asserts that any influence of one monad on 
another is only ideal in nature, lacking any physical causal relation on a monad’s internal 
activity
48
. Whilst all simple substances are self-sufficient in their complete individual 
concept, they are created in such a way as to be in accordance with all other simple 
substances. This mutual coordination of all substances in their expression of their 
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independent internal states is what constitutes the world of phenomena, of matter, space 
and time which expresses the appearance of causal interaction
49
. Within this system of 
mutual coordination, it can be said that one monad acts on another insofar as it has 
perfection, or reacts to another insofar as it is imperfect
50
. The notion of perfection 
corresponds to the distinctness, or confusedness, of a monad’s perceptions, and so is 
coordinated with its ‘actions’51. The more ‘perfect’ a simple substance is, the more it can be 
said to exert (an ideal) influence on another substance, or can be said to act on another
52
. 
So within this system of mutual coordination of an infinite plurality of independent 
substances, predetermined at their creation, one thing can be said to act upon another thing 
if it contains within its complete individual concept a sufficient reason for some 
characteristic of another substance
53
. And this mutual coordination of all substances in their 
unfolding of their inner natures constructs a harmonized whole, that is, the universe in its 
totality. 
In section 56 of the Monadology Leibniz connects this idea of pre-established harmony 
and the complete individual concept that every substance has in relation to all other 
substances: 
 
“Now this interlinkage or accommodation of all created things to each other, and of 
each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that 
express all other, and is in consequence a perpetual living mirror of the universe.”54 
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In order for all substances to operate in perfect mutual coordination with one another, 
each must contain within their own natures all their relations to all other substances which 
exist, and so each must reflect the entire universe from its own unique point of view
55
. And 
so every simple substance perceives the whole universe, however confusedly so, and 
represents “the many in the one”. Thus all simple substances are systematically interrelated 
to each other from their own unique point of views in such a way that constructs space and 
time, in which material things are realized
56
. That is to say that spatial position in the 
extended world is nothing except the perpetual relations between different monads
57
. As is 
further elaborated in section 60, Leibniz states that “nothing can restrict a monad to 
representing only on part of things”58. All monads perceive the entire universe and so are 
omniscient, albeit limited in distinctness. However only those things which are nearest or to 
which a substance is most extensively related to are perceived distinctly, with the majority 
of perceptions regarding the detail of the entire universe being confused. 
 
From here Leibniz elaborates on the relationship between the immaterial constituents of 
nature and the extended world of matter and motion that we experience. The mutual 
coordination and connectedness of all simple substances occurs not just at the monadic 
level, but at the level of material composites also
59
. As composites are derivative from the 
relations between individual simple substances, all matter and motion is interconnected to 
the universe as a harmonized whole. 
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On the matter of the connection between mind and body, in section 62 of the 
Monadology, Leibniz specifies that all monads represent most distinctly the body to which 
they are “bound”60. 
 
“And even as this body expresses the whole universe through the connection of all 
matter in the plenum, so the soul also represents the entire universe in representing 
this body, which belongs to it in a special way.”61 
 
While monads themselves are immaterial, the expression of complex relations between 
them form the basis of matter and motion in the extended world of phenomena. And, as 
such, each monad is associated with a particular body of matter to which it has perceptions 
of most clearly and distinctly
62
. As such there is a hierarchy of organisms in the 
phenomenal world parallel to the tripartite hierarchy of simple substances. A ‘mere 
organism’ is an integrated aggregate, composed of a plurality of monads and their relations, 
dominated, or unified, by a monad which has bare perceptions. Animals are organisms 
which are dominated by a soul, and an ‘intelligent creature’, such as human beings, are 
animals dominated by a spirit
63
. In this Leibnizian scheme, all monads are associated with 
some body of matter, and the physical world is subject to the same coordination and 
harmony as are simple substances. In section 69 Leibniz states: 
 
“Thus nothing is fallow, sterile, or dead in the universe; there is no chaos, no 
disorder save appearance.”64 
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All extended matter, having its substantial basis in these immaterial simple substances, 
which contain perceptions of their complex relations to all other things, and whose nature is 
one of constant flux from one state to another, is thus living and in perfect coordination 
with everything else in the universe. And while each living body has a dominant monad 
which unifies it as a whole, so too do each part of an organism
65
. 
 
So here we have a picture of the metaphysical ground from which all extended matter 
derives its substantial reality from. All matter, all phenomena, is the result of complex 
relations of simple substances, unfolding in perfect, mutual harmony. And as every bit of 
matter is associated with a plurality of these simple substances, the physical world is as  
interconnected and harmonious as is found at the monadic level. Each simple substance is a 
reflection of the universe as a whole, and so all matter and organisms are a “living mirror 
of the whole universe”66. Within this scheme there is no problem regarding mind and body 
interactions; the ‘soul’ and body follow from their own complete individual concepts in 
pre-established harmony. It is because of this underlying harmony, predetermined at 
creation of the world whole, that enables the totality of nature, at both a monadic and 
phenomenal level, to exist. The world of extension, the world that we experience, is the 
result of complex underlying processes of an infinite plurality of simple substances whose 
inner natures reflect the whole. And each of these simple substances contains perceptions 
and appetitions, soul-like qualities in which all of nature is represented and harmonized in a 
dynamic manner. 
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Computational Metaphysics 
 
Current theories of the space-time world as understood in terms of information and 
computation are highly varied and underdeveloped compared to atomistic or mechanical 
models. Theorists come from a range of different disciplines, from philosophy to physics, 
computer sciences, cognitive sciences and biology. Although there are many differences 
and some incompatibilities between competing theories there are some commonalities that 
run through the various theories that deserve some exploration. An outstanding example is 
that an understanding that all physical processes in the world have their basis in reality in 
terms of informational structures and computational processes, rather than purely in terms 
of the operations of physical, mechanical structures. Many theories acknowledge the 
original works of G. W. Leibniz, and later works by Wolfram, Turing and Fredkin in laying 
the ground on which they develop a computational understanding of the natural world. In 
particular, they recognize the role of mathematics not just as a tool for understanding the 
behaviour of physical systems but as essential to the computational nature of those systems. 
 
1. From matter to Information. 
 
 The 17
th
 century saw a transformation occur in the natural sciences to understanding the 
world in terms of the mechanics of matter and motion
67
. While the science of motion 
reduced the physical processes of the world to mathematical geometric relations, these 
operations were framed in a material basis where matter would come to dominate our 
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understanding of the ultimate constituents of reality
68
. The development of classical 
Newtonian physics further advanced the theory of atomism and the science of mechanics. 
The scientific view of the world became one where matter, in the form of atoms as 
fundamental units, and forces, which act on matter produced all the motion and physical 
processes in the world
69
. As the natural sciences advanced, ultimately the notion of 
consciousness disappeared almost entirely from the realm of physics; and the belief that we 
can understand everything in the universe from an investigation into the operations of 
matter took precedence
70
. This lead to a materialistic reduction of all things in the world in 
terms of inert, unthinking, particles and deterministic laws which govern the motions of 
those material parts
71
. Even attempts to understand mental events have been reduced to 
such physical laws in neuroscience and cognitive sciences. Those fields which, in an 
attempt to explicate the phenomena of consciousness, look towards physical structures and 
chemical processes in the human brain. The belief that by understanding the human brain 
we can then achieve a full account for mind and consciousness has spread into Western 
culture even outside the scope of those domains which hold that assumption. 
 
However, recent developments in the field of Quantum physics have threatened the 
metaphysical assumptions of a materialist framework. Several anomalies arise in quantum 
mechanics that challenge the Newtonian understanding of matter and energy. At the 
quantum micro level physical particles themselves, previously thought to be unchanging in 
nature, can convert to energy or waves, thus removing the ontological division between 
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matter and energy
72
. This energy and mass conversion undermines the notion of matter as 
the sole fundamental unit of reality
73
. In subatomic particles position and motion cannot be 
determined at the same time. The discovery of the indeterminacy of the behaviour of 
quantum particles directly poses a problem to the determinism of classical physics, which 
rely heavily on understanding physical processes in cause and effect relations
74
. But even 
more strikingly is the role of the observer in quantum mechanics. Classical physics 
eliminates the necessity for a conscious observer internal to the system being observed for 
the behaviour of physical systems. If indeed there is an observer of physical phenomena 
their role is held to be external to that system. However, in quantum physics any single 
phenomenon being observed can be described in multiple, often incompatible ways. An 
electron can be described as both a particle and a wave; such descriptions are dependent on 
the observer of the phenomenon and this observer is intrinsic to the system, not 
ontologically independent of it
75
. 
 
The exclusion of mind and consciousness from our framework of understanding the 
behaviour of physical phenomena itself is problematic. Some argue that it is incompatible 
to conceive of a universe governed solely by unthinking, mechanical processes, from which 
we can expect life and even consciousness to emerge. One theorist begins with the question 
“can mindless objects obey mathematical laws?” to explore the notion of mindfulness in 
physical phenomena
76
. From this question there are two choices available. Either physical 
objects are devoid of mind, thereby eliminating consciousness from the physical world and 
denying the substantial reality of minds. Or there is a degree of mentality, however limited, 
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immanent in the physical objects and processes of the universe, which manifests itself as 
laws of nature
77
. By assuming the second position we can then conceive of a world which 
is, at its most basic level, ripe for the development of living organisms and rational, 
mindful, conscious beings. 
 
This undermining of the classical, materialist framework demonstrates that, by excluding 
consciousness and reducing the entire universe to mechanics of matter and motion, we may 
have formed an incomplete view of the universe. Instead, some are proposing a shift away 
from matter and motion, towards an informational model of the universe. That is one in 
which information is the ultimate constituent of reality, manifested in the laws of physics 
and one from which matter is derived
78
. This is similar to Leibniz’s view, which 
understands the physical world as the result or expression of mathematical, algorithmic 
relationships based on underlying informational structures. 
 
2. Paradigm Shift: The Epistemic Value of Computational Metaphysics 
 
In addressing the emerging framework of computational metaphysics, we must first lay 
down the epistemological foundation by which to account for such a paradigm shift. The 
failures of the classical mechanic model of the universe in accounting for physical (small 
scale, quantum mechanical) and mental phenomena, I think can be resolved by adopting a 
metaphysical framework where information and computation are the fundamental 
constituents of nature. Much of what is addressed in this section, particularly the 
consequences of computational metaphysics in understanding mental phenomena, will be 
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expanded on later in this theses, but, for now, it is enough to note how these theories might 
be of epistemic value to us. 
 
One of the core ideas supporting the thesis of computational metaphysic is the notion of 
“conceptual economy”, in which simpler theories with comparable explanatory power of 
more complex theories can be used to explain complex behaviours of physical systems. 
Digital philosophy in particular, a subset of computational metaphysics, firmly asserts a 
system where there is a lesser conceptual complexity of a set of ideas which produce a 
description of the universe as both rich and diverse in phenomena
79
. If computation occurs 
at the most fundamental level of reality and is what ultimately constitutes the physical 
world, we have a metaphysical scheme in which simple, computational, algorithmic rules 
generate the complex, phenomenologically rich and diverse behaviours of physical entities 
and systems. By including informational structures which are carried through 
computational dynamics, we construct a picture of the world which not only accounts for 
the effectiveness of mathematical and computation models in describing physical processes, 
but we also admit for the phenomena of mind and semantics. In doing so we close the gap 
of our understanding between inanimate, mechanical, non-living systems with those of 
living organisms.  
 
One of the key theorists in developing several other arguments for the epistemic value of 
a computational view of the universe is Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic. Dodig-Crnkovic 
attempts to lay out not only a development of the notion of a computing universe, but also 
the ways in which these ideas can be used to fundamentally change the way in which we 
understand the physical world. Inspired by the work of Galileo in overturning the 
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geocentric model with the Copernican worldview, Dodig-Crnkovic, along with Vincent 
Muller, begin a dialogue contrasting the classical, mechanical understanding of the universe 
with the new model of information-computationalism. 
 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic also raises the most important criticism of the materialist 
doctrine relevant to this thesis, and that concerns the exclusion of mind and mental 
phenomena from the broadly mechanical picture of the physical world. Henry Stapp 
comments on the impact of this view on our picture of mind: 
 
“Neither the character of the basic description of the brain, within classical 
mechanics, nor the character of the classical dynamical laws that supposedly 
govern the brain, provides any basis for considering the brain correlate of a 
thought to be, at the fundamental as distinguished from functional level, a single 
whole entity.”80 
 
The argument is that since physical systems within a classical mechanical framework are 
understood in terms of a collection of material interacting parts, there is then no way to 
account for the experience of thoughts on the level of a single, unified mind
81
. The only 
way to account for the human mind in a mechanical universe is then to introduce another 
conception equivalent to the “ghost in the machine”, an appeal to a different type of 
(mental) phenomena
82
. The problem with this is that it introduces a dualistic notion into 
classical mechanics, which it fundamentally opposes by describing the world solely in 
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terms of physical constituents, matter, and natural physical laws
83
. This necessity for the 
addition of non-mechanical explanations, which contrast from the main metaphysical and 
physical understanding of the universe itself, removes the epistemological simplicity of the 
original doctrine. 
 
One of the strengths of an informational-computational framework is that, within the 
natural sciences, we already use such a model to describe much of the operations of the 
physical world with a reasonable degree of accuracy
84
. Even if one were to reject the 
overall thesis that the universe is in fact a cosmic computer, it’s still true that a 
computational model of the universe is useful as an explanatory tool until a more 
developed metaphysical and physical framework is discovered
85
. 
 
Much like Leibniz, to contrast the classical mechanistic perspective, Dodig-Crnkovic 
lays down the general principle of the model of the universe as a cosmic computer: the 
physical world is ultimately constituted by structures of information and dynamics of 
computation
86
. This is an interactive, dynamic model of the universe in which all physical 
systems are operating within a context-dependent network, relying on communication with 
a system’s environment87. Within this open system model, observers are not external to the 
system being observed, they are engaging with information processing that operates on all 
levels throughout the physical world
88
. And within this system, Dodig-Crnkovic argues, we 
can begin to account for emergent properties that supervene over physical structures; since 
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the properties of physical entities are no longer solely derived from the properties of their 
parts but also of the interactive network formed between the parts constituting the whole
89
. 
 
Whilst the model laid out in this dialogue is not a complete, comprehensive account of 
an emerging model of computational metaphysics, the points that Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 
lays out directly contribute to what she argues about the epistemic productivity of this 
scheme. As it is an emerging model, she takes note that it is still in development, but still 
argues that if we were to pursue such a paradigm shift it would not simply offer a more 
complete explanatory account for physical processes but might begin to reconcile some of 
the issues that arise from the contrasted model. The most prominent of these she identifies 
as the explanatory gap between living and nonliving systems in the world. 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic believes there is an explanatory gap in in understanding 
complex, living organisms in terms of lifeless mechanics of matter and motion. Instead she 
argues for the explanatory power of adopting the information-computationalist framework 
to unifying the living and nonliving world, accounting not simply for complex biological 
processes but even for a more comprehensive account of mind
90
. In this she identifies 
complexity not just as important for the occurrence of much of the physical phenomena, but 
as an essential characteristic of life
91
. More than just aggregates of inanimate matter, 
determined by mechanical laws, living organisms are “complex, goal-oriented, autonomous 
information-processing systems with [the] ability of self-organization, self-reproduction 
and adaptation”92. 
By understanding computational processes in nature, Dodig-Crnkovic believes that we 
can understand not just the systems of inquiry in physics, but also biology, sociology, 
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economics, and other fields where informational complexity is fundamental
93
. Using this 
framework we can understand the evolutionary process of natural selection as information-
processing adapting across generations and DNA as informational instructions for the 
development of organisms
94
. The DNA “code” in biological organisms is an excellent 
example of the applicability of this particular framework. Within each cell of an organic 
body there are a sequence of instructions which govern the way in which the organisms 
develops. This code determines all of the biological attributes of the organism, it is the 
“information in a seed”95. DNA contains both informational content and the “program”, the 
sequence of instructions, which underlies the physical development and processes within 
every living body. 
But more than just these biological processes we can also understand social dynamics 
within this unifying framework. That by understanding natural computation as an open 
system adapting dynamically to its environment, we can examine the self-organized 
behaviour of groups of organisms in terms of networks of complex information-processing 
interactions
96
. This extends to the behaviours of small living organisms, like the operations 
of ant colonies, all the way to complex social relations among human beings. 
 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic twice mentions the promises of the framework in explaining 
life as a “network of information processing structures”97. 
 
“[The] integration of scientific understanding of the phenomena of life 
(structures, processes) with the rest of natural world helping to achieve “the 
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unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” such as in physics even for complex 
phenomena like biology that today lack mathematical effectiveness.”98 
 
In this, she is seeking to unify scientific theory of natural, physical processes with an 
account for living organisms. There have already been comparisons between the structures 
and processes of life to such an information-computational framework. In biology, DNA 
can be understood as a “code of life”99 where the development of living organisms is 
determined by the underlying unfolding of algorithms encoded in complex protein 
structures. Such an approach takes the passing on of genetic traits as an information 
transfer across generations, containing instructions for biological developments.
100
 Dodig-
Crnkovic suggests that, even though we have not yet developed a full understanding of 
these processes due to the complexity of the structures of living organisms, we may 
eventually be able to achieve the same degree of mathematical effectiveness as we find in 
other natural sciences, like chemistry and physics. She is not just focusing on how an info-
computational model might change our current understanding of life, but in the potential 
future applications that it might yield. 
 
“Of all manifestations of life, mind seems to be information-theoretically and 
philosophically the most interesting one. Info-computationalism 
(pancomputationalism + paninformationalism) has a potential to support our effort 
in learning about mind.”101 
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For her, both brains and computers are dynamical systems which manipulate symbols, 
and this symbol manipulation occurs in higher levels of organization in which the symbols 
represent something significant for a living organism, they function as carriers of 
meaning
102
. For most living organisms, this response to symbol manipulation is 
unconscious, it is “built into their genes” for an organism to respond to their meaningful 
environmental input in such a way as to serve vital functions, such as getting food, 
avoiding harm and reproducing
103
. As such, meaning is embedded within this interactive 
model, even when its operations occur below the level of consciousness. Dodig-Crnkovic 
argues that this inclusion of semantics, through the universe’s fundamentally informational 
structure and the dynamic, interactive networks of any system operating within the world, 
has the potential to develop a view of semantics of information within a naturalist account. 
 
“Understanding the semantics of information as a part of data-information-
knowledge-wisdom sequence, in which more and more complex relational 
structures are created by computational processing of information. An evolutionary 
naturalist view of semantics of information in living organisms is based on 
interaction (information exchange) of an organism with its environment.”104 
 
 
 If life is to be understood as a network of information processing structures, then any 
account of the human mind or consciousness does not need to make an explanatory leap. 
Cognitive agents in the world like human beings are not mechanically determined by 
natural laws of cause and effect, they are adaptive, learning, anticipative beings engaged in 
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complex information processing through computational dynamics
105
. There is much left to 
be said about the hierarchy of complexity of nonliving entities and living organisms, and 
what consequences this might have for our understanding of mental phenomena, which will 
be discussed later in this thesis; but Dodig-Crnkovic’s argument here is about the 
explanatory value that rethinking our metaphysical assumptions may have for future 
understandings of the human mind. These ideas are reminiscent of Leibniz’s Monadology, 
in which life permeates the whole world at every level through complex relations between 
monads and the bodies that they correspond to.  
 
One of the other central arguments for the epistemic productivity of info-
computationalism that Dodig-Crnkovic puts forward is that of developing unified 
framework which encompasses diverse disciplines. In listing the promises of info-
computationalism, she writes: 
 
“The synthesis of the (presently alarmingly disconnected) knowledge from 
different fields within the common info-computational framework which will enrich 
our understanding of the world. Present day narrow specialization into different 
isolated research fields has gradually led into impoverishment of the common world 
view.”106 
 
By narrowing fields of inquiry within different disciplines, we do not possess a unified, 
interdisciplinary framework by which to understand the natural world. Many different 
disciplines make different metaphysical assumptions about the world: from classical 
physics working from a materialist doctrine, to mathematicians understanding the world in 
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terms of numbers, geometrical representations and algorithms, to psychology and 
neuroscience which account for mental phenomena either in terms of behaviours, some 
inner mental life or just as structures of the human brain. Dodig-Crnkovic suggests that, by 
understanding nature as ultimately constituted by the computational dynamics of 
information structures, we can create a unified framework which accounts for many 
disparate research fields. The epistemic value is that it can account for a vast array of 
different phenomena under a simpler scheme of information and computation. She also 
writes that info-computationalism can provide: 
 
“A unified picture of fundamental dual-aspect information/computation 
phenomenon applicable in natural sciences, information science, cognitive 
science, philosophy, sociology, economy and a number of others.”107 
 
By altering our framework, we can account for not just physical phenomena of the 
natural sciences, in which a mechanistic model can be understood as operating within the 
info-computational framework, but we can also provide explanatory power to the fields of 
cognitive science, psychology, sociology, et cetera. In creating a unified explanation of 
living and nonliving entities, and in developing an account of mind within this information 
processing scheme, the gaps between the fields of physics and chemistry and biology 
lessen. 
Muller concludes that these general principles of an information-computational 
metaphysical scheme, in which the universe is conceived as a cosmic computer, is 
underdeveloped to justify a paradigm shift. Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic, while 
acknowledging that this newly emerging framework still has some strides to make, argues 
                                                 
107
 Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and Vincent Muller, 2009, p.9 
41 
 
for the epistemic productivity of info-computationalism. She reasserts several justifications, 
like the unified framework of understanding, a unification of living and nonliving systems, 
and an understanding of semantics of information to develop a more comprehensive view 
of the mind and mental processes. Within a scheme in which all systems in the universe are 
complex, interactive networks of information processing, the gap between inanimate 
physical entities and complex living organisms begins to narrow; and, with an inclusion of 
semantics for informational structures and symbolic representations that occur with 
computational changes, this leads to an account of mental phenomena which is inclusive 
within the broader metaphysical scheme. 
 
3. The Intellectual legacy of Leibniz 
 
Most theorists in computational metaphysics pay some credit to Leibniz, some going so 
far as to call the transition in understanding from matter-energy relations to information-
computation relations as ‘Leibniz’s legacy’108. As laid out in Leibniz’s Monadology, his 
descriptions of simple substances (monads) are resonant with most computational 
metaphysical schemes. Leibniz laid out the rational foundation by which to consider the 
ultimate constituents of substantial reality as immaterial, computational processes, rather 
than physical structures. Even those thinkers that do not directly credit Leibniz share many 
of the themes he raised in the Monadology. The relationship between Leibniz and 
computational metaphysics will be explored in depth later in this thesis, under the heading 
‘computational monadology’. 
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One theorist, Chaitin, draws parallels between the emerging fields of digital philosophy 
and digital physics, placing philosophy in a central role regarding the questions raised by 
modern physics. Describing digital philosophy as “Leibniz’s legacy”109, Chaitin develops 
an ‘algorithmic information theory’, converging the disciplines of mathematics, theoretical 
computer science and theoretical physics using the concepts of information and 
computation
110. Using Wolfram’s “A New Kind of Science”, Fredkin’s cellular automata 
and Bekenstein-t’Hooft’s holographic principle, Chaitin argues for a theory of quantum 
information and quantum computation that takes precedence over the old models of matter 
and energy to form the foundation of the physical world
111
. This model can be used to 
question whether or not the entire universe is a computer, drawing an analogy between the 
way in which DNA “programs” living beings and the way in which God programs the 
universe
112
. 
 
Allan Randall, across several of his papers, attempts to reconcile current scientific 
advances in theoretical physics with the metaphysical axioms of Leibniz which predate it. 
Randall uses Leibniz’s principles of Sufficient Reason and Identity of Indiscernibles to 
demonstrate their applicability in understanding the “weirdness” of quantum theory113. 
Even though Randall ultimately rejects Leibniz’s assertion that there only exists one world 
out of an infinity of possible worlds, he remains confident that Leibniz’s theory of monads 
can provide an alternate account on such things as quantum superposition
114
.. He argues 
that quantum mechanics can be understood within an a priori, rationalist framework, 
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understanding the laws of nature as tautologies of pure reason
115
. In doing so, he not only 
demonstrates the relevance of Leibniz’s work with contemporary physical theories, but also 
outlines a shift away from mechanistic accounts of the physical world and towards a 
mathematical model which corresponds to a computational view of the universe. 
 
Tagliabue, much like Chaitin, uses Wolfram’s “A New Kind of Science” and Fredkin’s 
concept of cellular automata to rethink our basic metaphysical assumptions about the world, 
supporting a new scientific paradigm of digital physics. His core principle centers around 
the notion that simple rules can lead to complex, phenomenally rich behaviours, and that 
these simple rules form the computational foundation of the physical world
116
. Much like 
other theorists Tagliabue argues for the ‘finite nature hypothesis’, which rejects the 
Leibnizian notion of change as continuous, and argues that every quantity of physics, 
including space and time, will turn out to be both discrete and finite. Tagliabue attempts to 
utilize the concept of cellular automata as tools for understanding pattern formation and 
complexity found in the physical world, at one point comparing the basic substrate of 
physics to the operations of these cellular automata
117
. Within this new digital framework 
for understanding natural laws, Tagliabue resituates philosophy at the frontier of science, in 
which a theory of a digital universe may be used to model and “debug” existing 
philosophical theories
118
. 
 
Jonathan Edwards, in his paper “21st Century Monadology” reworks Leibniz’s 
Monadology to draw parallels between this and modern field theory. While Edwards 
departs from some of Leibniz’s ideas, namely that matter is infinitely divisible and monads 
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as enduring, he argues that the dynamicism found in Leibniz’s works is compatible with 
advanced theoretical science. Most notable of which is that the ultimate constituents of the 
universe are increasingly seen as units of force rather than units of matter
119
. That is, that 
the phenomena of matter is not rooted in the material structure of things, but rather in units 
of force in dynamic relations. He uses a Leibnizian understanding of how each monad 
represents the universe to describe how the energy bearing modes in modern physics are 
dynamic patterns which are made possible by the rest of the universe; such as an electron 
orbital
120. Edwards also draws parallels between Leibniz’s grades of monads (bare monads, 
souls and spirits) to ideas about neurocomputation. One of the strengths of Edwards’ paper 
is what he calls “graded panexperientialism”, where an interpretation of the Monadology in 
terms of modern field theory renders redundant the ‘hard problem of consciousness’121. In 
Leibniz’s account, all of the basic constituents of the physical world have some degrees of 
perception, all things are endowed with some basic, limited, unconscious mentality, and 
consciousness is simply a threshold above which things are reflexively aware. 
 
Nakagomi is concerned with the internal world of monads. While all monads represent the 
entire universe to some degree, each monad has its own unique perspective. He identifies 
the primary content of a monad’s internal world as including ‘self-image’ and ‘other-
images’; that is the degree to which a monad is self-reflexive, and its degrees of distinct 
perceptions
122
. Like Leibniz and others, Nakagomi does not think that material explanations 
can completely account for the experience of human consciousness. Instead he accounts for 
human volition in terms of a monad’s changing its own internal state by acting on its self-
image, where this action itself is deterministic in accordance with the monad’s internal 
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principle
123. Nakagomi asserts the necessity for Leibniz’s pre-established harmony in such 
as system, through which the individual monads internal worlds are synchronized to a 
“common world” which does not exist in the monadistic world; the common world is 
virtual
124
. While Nakagomi does not directly refer to digital physics or digital metaphysics, 
it is clear that his interpretation of Leibniz’s Monadology is in line with that of Uchii and 
Steinhart’s, rejecting material accounts for the occurrence of natural phenomena in favour 
of an information-computationalist interpretation. The physical, material world is virtual, a 
product of the harmony of a plurality of monads whose ‘coding’ form the foundation of 
space, time, matter and motion. 
 
 
4. Cellular Automata 
 
Stephen Wolfram, a scientist known for his advancement of theoretical physics, 
established in his ‘A New Kind of Science’ a model for a digital computational universe 
understood in terms of mathematical relations. Wolfram proposed that digital information 
underlies the quantum level, creating a shorter description, or ‘compression’ of the 
universe
125
. This digital information model argues that simple, computational, rules 
produce the rich, complex behaviours of physical phenomena
126
. For Wolfram, the goal of 
“digital physics” is to develop a minimal model to describe the universe in order to create a 
unified theory
127
. 
Edward Fredkin’s work on cellular automata also contributes to an understanding of 
computational metaphysics. He proposed that our universe is one, complex, single 
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automaton which is always digitally computing its next state
128
. He posits that every 
physical object and their motions are just patterns on this complex cellular automaton, the 
universe
129. He posits four laws of ‘Digital Physics”; that information is conserved; that the 
fundamental process of nature is computational; that the state of physical systems must 
have digital representations; and that change is only produced via a digital information 
process
130
. He argues that all information can be thought as digital, and so must have a 
digital means of representation; as such, then all changes in information must necessarily 
be the consequence of these digital information processes
131
.  
The works of both Wolfram and Fredkin are mentioned in various works arguing for 
digital philosophy and digital physics. This understanding of physical objects and their 
relations is fundamentally digital, in the sense that discrete computational structures 
underlie these physical events
132
. However, the view of these discrete processes is 
incompatible with Leibniz’s understanding of change, at both the phenomenal and monadic 
levels, as continuous. The ‘finite nature hypothesis’ that both Wolfram and Fredkin 
support, along with some of the theorists of digital metaphysics, argues that every quantity 
of physics, including space and time, will turn out to be both finite and discrete
133
. For the 
sake of expediency, the question of whether the universe and the computational processes 
within it are finite and discrete or infinite and continuous will not be addressed in depth in 
this thesis. Computational metaphysics has theorists that support either a digital (discrete) 
hypothesis or a continuous (analogue) hypothesis. Both theories set information and 
computation at the center of metaphysical and physical inquiry in a manner appropriate to 
Leibniz’s monadic scheme; unavoidable incompatibilities are dealt with by other theorists. 
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5. Features of Computational Metaphysics. 
 
Already we have seen that, across diverse theories, the push towards computational 
metaphysics is dominated by an understanding of the physical world as fundamentally 
informational and computational in nature. This has implications not just in the field of 
physics, but in biology and neuroscience, whose goal is to understand living organisms and 
the mind. Some of the computational models used to demonstrate these theories assume the 
‘finite nature hypothesis’, with the underlying presupposition that, at the most fundamental 
level, the computational operations of the universe will be both finite and discrete, violating 
Leibniz’s notion of the continuum. Other models use either analog processes or a hybrid of 
the two. While this is an interesting problem within this field, whether nature is ultimately 
‘digital’ and discrete or analog, this is not a central concern for this thesis. The notion of 
computational metaphysics is still in development, and as such disputes over which models 
are more effective are still yet to be resolved. 
At the core of most of these theories is that the physical world, all of matter and motion, 
are the result of more fundamental computational processes. These theories account not 
only for the motions of material objects but also seek a more comprehensive account of 
living organisms and the experience of consciousness. The use of computational 
descriptions may enable us to better understand the idea of life as an emergent property of 
complex, though seemingly mindless, systems. If the ultimate constituents of nature are 
informational structures undergoing dynamic computational processes, then living 
organisms can be understood as an increasing complexity of these existing processes … 
and this can be extended to a concept of the mind. Through these informational structures 
some degree of mentality underlies all material bodies and physical systems in the world. 
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Computational Monadology 
 
While there are many different theories regarding computational metaphysics, I 
primarily focus on those developed closely with Leibniz’s Monadology in mind. The work 
done on computational monadology retains the rational foundation of Leibniz’s peculiar 
exposition into the essence and nature of substances, yet remains pliable enough to resonate 
with current developments of modern science. These theories focus on the features of 
Leibniz’s simple substances (monads), which function as fundamental units of computation 
and whose relations generate the spatio-temporal world of matter and motion. And the 
peculiar properties, or ‘qualities’ that these monads possess as giving rise to mental 
phenomena such as consciousness, memory, self-consciousness and reason. There are two 
dominant theorists that I explore in this scheme, Eric Steinhart, a strong proponent of 
digital philosophy, and Soshichi Uchii who takes on an informational interpretation. 
 
1. General characteristics of Monads 
 
In line with Leibniz’s Monadology, the monads of a computational scheme are 
quantitatively simple, incorporeal basic units whose relations generate complex physical 
objects and processes. They consist of a system of qualities that can be described as a 
system of equations, or, rather, a program
134
. It is the programs of monads, defined in terms 
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of mathematical equations, which form the logical basis for the physical world as an 
embodied, logical machine
135
. 
 
Soshichi Uchii draws attention to how Leibniz likened a monad to an automaton, even 
using the phrase ‘incorporeal automata’136. He explores the basic features of monads using 
an informational interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysical scheme. As computational units, 
monads are immaterial, ultimate substances which produce all physical and mental 
phenomena in the world
137
. Without mass, nor shape, nor parts, monads are defined by their 
complex, qualitative internal states. These internal states within a single monad reflect the 
internal states of all other monads, and so contain within themselves perceptions of the 
entire universe
138
. Far from being static, unchanging entities, monads are dynamic, they 
contain within themselves the striving towards change, which is identified as the state-
transition function
139. In Uchii’s interpretation, monads function as ‘bearers of 
information’, and so changes to the internal states of any monad is actually a change in the 
informational content of the monad
140
. This informational content directly correlates with 
the perceptual content of a monad in any given state; changes to this informational content 
are a computational process, taking Leibniz’s monadic appetition as the state-transition 
function of a monad
141
. This state-transition function governing a monad’s series of 
changes is determined at the moment of creation in line with Leibniz’s pre-established 
harmony
142
. All phenomena, physical and mental, which arises in the world are a result of 
the informational content and computational processes of monads, and the “coding” which 
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produces the pre-established harmony of all monads
143
. As with Leibniz, Uchii identifies 
God as the source of this coding which governs the state-transition function of all 
monads
144
. As such, the whole series of changes of the informational content of any monad 
is given at the moment of creation, in such as manner as to ensure that its changes are 
compatible with those of all other monads
145
. And Uchii argues that, to completely 
understand the world, we would have to have a full account not only of the informational 
content of each monad and their state-transition functions, but also of “God’s coding” of the 
pre-established harmony which enables the formal relations of monads to produce complex 
physical, and mental, phenomena
146
. As such, God alone can comprehend the entire 
universe, we have only limited access through the world of phenomena and the capacity to 
reason through eternal truths. 
 
Eric Steinhart adopts another perspective in his ‘Computational Monadology’, where he 
also explores the basic features of monads in developing a digital metaphysics. He 
describes monads as immaterial, algorithmic entities and the spatio-temporal world as 
virtual, a ‘software’ program running from the incorporeal ‘hardware’ of monads. He 
defines the internal changes of monads as the “inner logical-mathematical transformations” 
of their internal qualities
147
; these transformations are essentially algorithmic in nature. As 
such, the changes of qualities, or informational content, of monads are the result of monads 
computing their own algorithm and generating their next state
148
. The informational 
contents of monads are described as a system of mathematical qualities whose equations are 
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the program which a monad executes, through the algorithmic transformations
149
. And 
these qualities are understood as variables which are able to take on different values, and 
whose patterns, through the ideal relations between monads, produce material things in the 
world
150
. Using Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, Steinhart agrees that 
these internal qualities are different for each monad, all containing many complex relations 
and properties
151
. While each monad may be able to simulate the entire universe from their 
own unique point of view, it is the differentiae between monads which produces the entire 
world, including space, time and motion
152
. 
Steinhart agrees with Leibniz that perception, an essential feature of all monads, cannot 
be explicated on mechanical grounds
153
. Computing monads are not physical machines, 
they are informational computing structures which underlie all matter and motion. As such, 
the interactions between monads are purely formal, or ideal in nature, there is no 
mechanical interaction by which the internal states of a monad are altered by any other
154
. 
The formal relations between monads, in Steinhart’s digital metaphysics, do not create 
matter as such, rather they algorithmically generate the appearances of matter and motion, 
which are virtual, i.e. higher-order properties which specify the relevant property, 
material.
155
. 
 
Both Steinhart and Uchii accept the preliminary description of Leibniz’s monads as 
immaterial, computing automata. Their focus on the basic descriptions of monads form the 
basis for their later metaphysical claims about the nature of space, time and motion; the 
character of perception; the relationship between monads and physical bodies; and the 
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exploration of mental phenomena. In both of their accounts the entire universe is generated 
by mathematical algorithms or programs executed by monads in accordance with the pre-
established harmony of the monadic whole. The qualities of each monad in any given state 
are the informational content of the universe from a unique perspective, and the changes to 
these states is governed by each monad’s internal, computational program.  
 
2. Space and Time 
 
The programs of all monads, from their unique perspectives, is what defines the spatio-
temporal world
156
. Rather than space and time existing independently, and through which 
matter and motion of physical phenomena can be understood, this computational 
monadology posits that it is the relations between monads themselves which generate space 
and time. Since monads are the logical basis for the physical world, the internal states of a 
monad are always coordinated with all other monads in pre-established harmony. It is this 
harmony and mutual coordination which results in the actualization of those programs 
which generates space and time
157
. Space and time are relational constructs, the medium 
generated by monads through mutual coordination, and in which physical phenomena are 
defined
158
. 
 
Steinhart demonstrates that monads are neither in space nor time, but rather that both 
space and time are virtual and the product of the coordination of monadic 
transformations
159
. As the basic features of monads include the lack of extension as 
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immaterial automata, monads cannot exist in space
160
. And since monads are programmed 
at creation, the start and end of the world are the “logical limits” of the world, and are not in 
the world as such
161
. From this, Steinhart argues that monads are substantially real and that 
both space and time are virtual; they are digital representations that result from the mutual 
relations among monads based on their internal properties
162
. The coordination of internal 
qualities of monads interrelated by geometric relations produce immaterial patterns which 
give rise to the spatial structure of the world
163
. 
 
Uchii also examines the relationship between the reality of monads, which are conceived 
of as existing without space or time, and phenomena which occur in space and time
164
. This 
extends not only to physical processes, but also mental phenomena, such as sensation and 
thought, which need spatial and temporal concepts in order to be exemplified.
165
. To say 
that there is a pain in my head is both to give a spatial location to the sensation being 
experienced, and the time through which the sensation is experienced. It is the collection of 
sets of monads which produce any physical body in the phenomenal world
166
. And since 
monads possess only qualitative properties, Uchii argues that the quantitative properties of 
the phenomenal world are added through encoding in the realm of phenomena
167
. In other 
words, it is not just the algorithms within individual monads that produce phenomena, but 
the mutual coordination by way of pre-established harmony, or “God’s coding”. 
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Space and time, in which the phenomena of matter and motion reside, do not have 
independent ontological existence in computational monadology. They are the structures in 
which the appearances of physical phenomena are perceived by us, which arise only from 
the mutual coordination of all monadic entities. Spatial structures are formed by 
mathematical geometric relations expressed in the internal states of monads, and time is an 
order of succession by which the spatial relations are determined by the coordinated 
unfolding of a monad’s inner algorithm168. 
 
3. Dynamics of Motion in physical phenomena 
 
Uchii’s metaphysical scheme of computational monadology explores the notion of force 
and dynamics in both the monadic and phenomenal realms before developing a full account 
of the relation between monads and bodies. While the term “force” was largely neglected in 
Leibniz’s Monadology, compared to his earlier works, Uchii explores the concepts in terms 
of activity and passivity. Uchii emphasizes the informational features of this force relation, 
primarily that the distinction between activity and passivity as one of perceptual 
distinctness
169
. Since there is no intersubstantial interaction between monads the idea that 
one monad ‘acts upon’ another is purely an ideal relation, not one of mechanical 
interaction. One monad is said to ‘act upon’ another when it contains within it more distinct 
perceptions; and is said to ‘be acted upon’ when it contains more confused perceptions170. 
So the source of monadic action and passivity is found within the informational content of 
the perceptions, as more distinct or obscure
171
. 
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Uchii identifies the primitive forces as the transition function of monads, i.e. their 
striving towards change, or appetition
172
. As such, primitive force persists within a monad 
itself as the determined sequence of operations that takes place consecutively in a monad
173
. 
This transition function represents the totality of all possible combinations of internal states 
that any monad will undergo
174
. However, each individual operation of the transition 
function of a monad can be understood in terms of derivative force, a modification of 
primitive force
175
. A single operation of the transition function of a monad determines, 
through the present internal state and the present input, the next internal state of the 
monad
176
. Since the changes which occur in the phenomenal world must have their ultimate 
basis in the changes of underlying monads, the activity and passivity of physical 
phenomena originates in the transition function of monads
177
. Just as time and space are not 
substantially real, motion in the phenomenal world does not really exist
178
. The physical 
dynamics of motion are a phenomenon that we are able to see in our conscious perception, 
it does not have a basis in reality except as the notion of force expressed in monads
179
. In 
the physical phenomena of collisions, for example, there is no real transfer of force as 
appears to our conscious perception. Each body is moved by its own derivative forces 
governed by the set of monads which correspond to it
180
. And it is because of the pre-
established harmony that its motions correspond to the motions of other bodies as 
aggregates of monads
181
. 
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4. State Transition Function of Monads 
 
As we’ve mentioned already, the computational processes which underlie all worldly 
phenomena occur in the state-transitions of monadic internal qualities. While all monads 
reflect or represent the entire universe in its perceptions, the transition function, or 
appetition, refers to the internal striving towards change in its own internal state. If 
perception is viewed as the informational content of monads, then the transition function is 
a monad’s algorithmic execution of its own internal program, computing its next internal 
state. 
The notion of change in Steinhart’s digital metaphysics is somewhat incompatible with 
the Leibnizian scheme. By subscribing to the finite nature hypothesis advocated by 
Wolfram and Fredkin, Steinhart has to reconcile this with his interpretation of Leibniz’s 
monadic scheme. Rather than seeing change as continuous, Steinhart argues that the 
changes in monads over time occur in discrete stages
182
. However, this does not lead 
Steinhart to dispense with the Leibnizian metaphysical scheme. 
Steinhart argues that since physical change in the phenomenal world is mathematically 
ordered, one can then assume the existence of mathematical structures and dynamics within 
monads themselves
183. And the changes to a monad’s internal states are driven by their 
“inner logical-mathematical transformations”, what Leibniz calls appetition, and what Uchii 
calls their transition function
184
. The set of qualities which forms the complete concept of 
any given monad is described as a system of equations which form the logical basis for the 
structure of the universe, putting mathematics into motion
185
. Steinhart also identifies the 
algorithmic function of the changing of a monad’s internal states as a recursive program. 
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The internal state of a monad at any given moment is entirely determined by its previous 
states and by the internal program that it is executing. As such, the qualitative detail of a 
monad’s state is the function of its previous states in a recursive program186. 
 
Unlike Steinhart, Uchii’s computational monadological system does not strongly adhere 
to the finite nature hypothesis model and maintains the Leibnizian claim that all change is 
continuous. However, like Steinhart’s model, Uchii describes the state-transition function 
of monads as the spontaneous, mathematical computing of a monad’s own internal states. 
And the entire series of changes, the transition function, of all monads are predetermined at 
the moment of their creation
187. It is ‘primitive’ force which governs the operations of this 
function in the realization through a monad’s execution of its computational program188. 
This primitive force contains both active and passive relations which form an essential role 
regarding the informational content of monads
189
. As described earlier, monadic activity, in 
which one monad can be said to ‘act upon’ another monad, is explained via the distinctness 
or confusedness of perceptual content. Since there is no mechanical interaction by which 
monads can impart force to one another, and since all the operations of a monad originate 
internally from their predetermined transition function, the activity and passivity in monads 
is purely ideal, or formal
190. This ‘dual nature’ of the active and passive forces contained 
within a monad’s internal computational program is then reflected in the behaviour of 
physical phenomena derived from the complex relations in the monadic realm
191
 
Because monads, to some degree, reflect in their internal qualities the totality of the 
world and their relations to all other monads, any changes of the internal state of any given 
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monad also includes the state changes of all other monads
192
. As such, both active and 
passive primitive forces must be contained within the transition function of all monads; 
when any monad is said to ‘act upon’ another in an ideal relation, another monad holds 
within its program the relation of ‘being acted upon’193. The only way to achieve perfect, 
mutual coordination through these complex ideal relations between monads, which are the 
sole causes of their own operations, is through the pre-established harmony determined at 
the moment of creation. As such, the transition function of monads follows from 
teleological law; they are not bound by the constraints of cause and effect that appears to us 
in the phenomenal world, but operate self-sufficiently towards their own ends
194
. 
 
 
5. Perceptions as Informational Content 
 
In computational monadology, as with Leibniz’s original conception of monads, the 
other essential feature of monads are complex, internal qualities contained within each 
monad as its perceptions. If the transition function of a monad is the computational, 
immaterial process of changing its internal states, then the perceptions contained within 
these states can be described as the informational content of each monad. These two 
fundamental characteristics form the informational-computational nature of the ultimate 
reality on which physical phenomena is derived. In Leibniz’s Monadology, monads as 
simple substances contain within themselves a reflection of the entire universe through their 
perceptions of the infinite plurality of all other monads. No two monads can have the same 
qualitative perceptual content; rather, each monad represents the entire universe from its 
own unique position, which contains both distinct and confused perceptions. A monad at 
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any given state contains this representation of the universe, and the transition function is 
what computes the next internal state of the monad, altering the distinctness and obscurity 
of the perceptions a monad has of the universe. This notion of perception as the 
informational content of a monad is what ultimately gives rise to the conception of mind 
and consciousness in the phenomenal world. Monads, as the fundamental units of the world 
are conceived of as “points endowed with mentality”, however limited, through the 
distinctness of their perceptions
195
. This is the mindfulness immanent in the cosmos; hence, 
no object in the world is without some minimal mentality
196
. 
As such, the notion of perception is crucial to Steinhart’s digital metaphysics framework. 
He describes this “perpetual living mirror” of the universe as the set of mathematical 
structures which form the ideal relations between monads
197
. These internal representations 
of the whole contained within each monad are what he calls the “structure-preserving 
functions”, in which the formal relationships between monads act as “structure-preserving 
maps”198. For Steinhart, space, time and matter are all virtual, whose common 
“worldspace” is derived from the formal relations between monads199. Since each monad 
has its own unique perspective of the world in its complex perceptions, as internal 
mathematical points, the perceptual content of each monad is the basis for the informational 
structure of the phenomenal world. The common worldspace is structured by these formal 
relations which supervene over monads as immaterial patterns which constitute virtual 
space, time and matter
200
. So it is the coordinated, formal relations between all monads 
which preserve the informational structure of the universe, expressed as the spatio-temporal 
physical world that we experience.  
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Steinhart describes the concept of perception at the monadic level in information-
computational terms. He refers to perception as the “perceptive subprogram” of each 
monad which not only represents the entire universe, but functions to comprehend those 
representations
201
. The informational content contained within each monad in its perception 
of the universe is then not simply mathematical relations, but there is a limited degree of 
mentality immanent in the monadic realm. Monads do not simply generate virtual space 
and time in which the motions of matter are governed by mathematical algorithms, but are 
also the substantial reality for the occurrence of mental phenomena. This relationship 
between mental and physical phenomena is crucial for the explanation of both of how 
bodies are manifested in the phenomenal world, but also to explain the phenomena of the 
emergence of mental life and consciousness. 
 
As I have already discussed, in Soshichi Uchii’s informational interpretation of the 
Monadology, his conception of monads are as the “bearers of information”, whose state 
changes are described as changes in the informational content. It is changes in the 
informational content of a monad, computing its next state that form the substantial basis 
for the dynamics of force. So the perceptions of a given monad are transitory states which 
are determined by the transition function (appetition) of that monad
202
. Uchii asserts that 
the phenomenal world is the result of higher order perceptions which are produced in 
organic bodies operating in harmonious formal relations
203
. The correspondence between 
the activities of monads and the world of phenomena is determined by the pre-established 
harmony coordinating the perceptions of the monadic aggregates whose relations constitute 
physical bodies
204
. Uchii discusses the role of perception in terms of the ‘flow of 
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information’ in a hierarchy of programs, illustrated with Leibniz’s own example of how it is 
that we hear the roar of ocean waves. 
When we hear the ocean’s roar, our bodies’ monadic constituents receive ‘petite 
perceptions’ of the actions of innumerable small waves, the effect of which we can only 
perceive confusedly as a ‘roar’; one cannot distinguish these petite perceptions 
individually
205. In Uchii’s interpretation, the flow of information of this phenomenon 
transfers from each innumerably small wave to the sensory organs of our ears, to the 
conscious perception of our anima (soul) through a hierarchy of programs governing 
organic bodies
206
. In order to understand petite perceptions, Uchii extrapolates from the 
original imagery: imagine that there are thousands of observers at various locations on the 
sea, and that each of those individual observers correspond to the petite perceptions that lie 
below the threshold of conscious perception. As such, Uchii says that the flow of 
information through monadic relations which underlie physical phenomena becomes less 
distinct as it propagates to a distant place
207
. By this he means that the bodies in the 
physical world corresponding to those small, innumerable waves have more distinct 
perceptions of their relations than an observer whose perception of this activity cannot 
distinguish those minute perception and can only hear the confused roar of the sea. Monads 
have more distinct perceptions representing the bodies to which they correspond, and the 
substantial structure of those phenomenal bodies can be understood in terms of a hierarchy 
of monadic programs
208. Since the governing monadic relations constituting the observer’s 
body do not directly correspond to those representing the individual innumerable waves, 
they cannot have distinct perceptions of them. 
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6. Bodies in the Phenomenal World 
 
Before we can understand the emergent phenomena of consciousness and higher order 
mental capacities such a reason within this computational monadological framework, we 
must first explore the relationship between the monadic realm and the behaviours of bodies 
in the phenomenal world. This was briefly touched upon by Uchii in the understanding of 
conscious perceptions of the phenomenal world as the operations of a hierarchy of 
programs, but deserves further analysis. I have already established that, within this 
framework, space and time are the results of immaterial, monadic relations coordinated via 
Leibniz’s notion of pre-established harmony. The dynamics of motion in the phenomenal 
world are governed by each monad’s internal state, in the distinctness of perception, and the 
transition function, as containing within itself both active and passive forces. Within these 
complex processes, I now explore the relationship between monadic entities and the 
phenomenal bodies to which they correspond and whose logical basis for existence lies in 
monads themselves. 
In Steinhart’s computational monadology, each monad’s program is focused on the body 
to which is corresponds. Steinhart describes this correspondence using an example of the a 
person’s vision of surroundings in relation to their walking. As the body moves through 
space it remains at the center of its perceptual field; the external phenomena of other bodies 
in the visual field grow in distinctness or confusedness depending on their proximity to the 
body
209. As such, a monad’s body is defined by Steinhart as the pattern at the center of the 
monad’s “grid” that represents the entire universe210. This, together with the program of the 
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monad is what constitutes the unity of an organism
211
; a body is composed of the formal 
interrelations between an aggregate of monads unified under a dominant entelechy. In the 
case of a living animal, this entelechy is called a ‘soul’ (or ‘anima’) which allows for the 
emergence of consciousness as the expression of mental-state patterns supervening over the 
set of unified monads
212
. 
There is a hierarchy of programs in which the dominant monad, the ‘entelechy’, unifies 
and governs the programs of all other monads whose computational processes constitute the 
body. The members of the set of aggregated monads that form any complex living body are 
themselves filled with other living things, each with their own dominant entelechies. 
  
“Every animal’s body is a pattern centered on its focal cell. So this pattern is 
distributed over the material world. These bodies grow and decay, unfolding and 
enfolding their complexities. These bodies are infinitely complex. They vary in size 
from what we see to microscopic (even infinitesimal). The arrangements of parts of 
bodies change over time, but bodies never entirely perish, at worst, they simply 
become infinitesimal microscopic seeds.”213 
 
The infinite complexity and continuity in Leibniz’s Monadology that Steinhart refers to 
is incompatible with Steinhart’s stance that all of nature is discrete and finite. However, he 
retains the crucial features of the relationship between monadic entities and phenomenal 
bodies, and the notion that there is no ontological distinction between inanimate objects 
and living organisms; that it is only a difference by degrees in perception. The body which 
corresponds to a monad as its governing entelechy can thus never entirely perish. The 
dominant entelechy governing any collection of monads that form a complex body can be 
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said to ‘act on’ the other monadic members of the collection. And while these other 
monads are all dominant entelechies of their own over their corresponding aggregate 
bodies, they are said to ‘be acted upon’ by the unifying monad to which they are 
subordinate. So the unity of organic bodies in the phenomenal world are the products of the 
pre-established harmony of the activities and passivity found within each monad as a 
member which constitutes these bodies
214
.  
Uchii’s interpretation of the relationship between monads and phenomenal bodies uses 
computational descriptions as a hierarchy of programs in a many layered structure. As 
Uchii does not subscribe to the finite nature hypothesis, he argues that the infinite 
divisibility of matter means that there are an infinite number of sublayers of programs 
underlying any material body
215
. Any complex, material body is the result of the 
organization of an innumerable number of monads, with a central governing monad that 
acts as the body’s central processing unit (CPU)216. Each of these individual monads whose 
relations constitute organic bodies have been individually programmed, at the moment of 
the creation of all monads, to coordinate harmoniously in view of the whole 
organization
217
. At the top of the hierarchy of programs is the program of the dominant 
monad which unifies and governs the operations of the whole organism; a role analogous to 
the operations of a computer’s CPU218. From this dominant program, various subprograms 
follow ad infinitum, each computing their own state-transition functions in accordance with 
all other monadic programs running within the organized whole
219
. So any organic body is 
an organized collection of programs, containing within themselves a sequence of 
instructions for executing their various state transitions, operating as a harmonious whole 
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under the active program of the dominant monad. As with Steinhart’s model, the governing 
entelechy is the active program insofar as more reasons can be found within the monad’s 
own complete concept for the behaviours of the other monads acting in accordance with the 
dominant monad’s own program220. As such, it is this dominant monad which forms the 
most distinct perceptions of the organic body to which it corresponds with
221
. 
As with Steinhart, Uchii also describes the nature of organic bodies in the phenomenal 
world in terms of cellular automata. As the universe is filled with matter, eliminating any 
notion of a vacuum or a void, each body is in direct contact with all of its neighbors in the 
plenum
222. So the universe is filled with an infinite number of “cells”, where their spatial 
relations are defined by the monadic coordination of mathematical geometric relations
223
. 
The informational flow through this cellular space is then transferred through a chain of 
immediate contacts
224
. Uchii explains that this is why the conscious perceptions that a body 
has of itself are more distinct than the perceptions of those things occurring at a distance to 
the body in this cellular space
225
. The flow of information in the perception of the sound of 
the ocean can only occur to our consciousness as a confused roar since the petite 
perceptions of each innumerable small wave has to be transferred through the cellular space 
as it propagates to the distant observer
226
. Within this conception, all bodies which occupy 
the phenomenal world are the products of monadic aggregates which function as cellular 
automata, whose universal coordinated harmony produce the whole world as a single, 
cellular automaton
227
.  Uchii refers to the organized structure of a group of monads that 
correspond to a particular body as its “collective state” and the coordinated unfolding of 
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their state-transitions as the “common force”228. The collective state produces the place of a 
body in the phenomenal world relative to all other bodies, and the common force of the 
monads in any given set corresponding to a body contribute to the changes of the body as a 
whole
229
. 
 
The body of any set of monads is thus always in a state of perpetual change, and the 
relations between dominant and subordinate monads change over time
230
. Monads are not 
just the source from which physical bodies in the phenomenal world are derived, but are 
also the source for mental phenomena. As such, there can be no material body that is 
completely devoid of some limited semblance of mental life, since these bodies would then 
have to be devoid of monads, something incompatible with this scheme
231
. Thus there is no 
sharp ontological distinction between “inanimate” matter and living, organic bodies232. In 
line with Leibniz’s original account, in computational monadology there is no difference in 
kind between unconscious and inanimate bodies and living organisms, the difference is 
only one of degree in the complexity of the monadic organization and the distinctness of its 
overall perceptions. 
 
7. Body-Mind Correspondence 
 
Having established the complex relationship between material bodies and the monadic 
organizations from which they are derived, we can now explore the concept of mind within 
this computational monadological scheme. Both Steinhart and Uchii follow Leibniz’s 
hierarchy of monads; from bare monads, to ‘souls’, those governed by an ‘anima’, to 
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spirits. One of the principal advantages of this computational monadological framework is 
to reduce the explanatory gap between non-conscious inanimate matter and animate 
material beings which manifest consciousness
233
. Since mental life permeates through the 
physical world via the underlying immaterial monadic structures, consciousness can be 
explained as an emergent phenomenon above a certain threshold of complexity. 
 
Uchii’s account of the mind-body relation, while not as highly developed as Steinhart’s, 
follows from his informational interpretation of Leibniz’s Monadology. In living 
organisms, it is only the governing program unifying the whole that has the most distinct 
perceptions and is capable of consciousness
234
. A living body, itself the result of the 
organization of an infinite number of monads, is controlled by the ‘soul’, or ‘anima’235. 
This ‘anima’ of the body “controls” the body via its program (its transition function); 
according to Uchii’s view this control is not causal in the mechanical-efficient sense we use 
with regard to middle-sized things. The dominant program of any body is active insofar as 
it has more distinct perceptions and has more reasons within itself for the movements of the 
body than the subprograms which operate under it
236. With his ‘flow of information’ 
example regarding the roar of the sea, the conscious perception of the confused roar is 
produced by the ‘anima’ as a product of the various, unconscious, subprograms operating 
under it
237
.  
 
In Steinhart’s digital interpretation of Leibniz’s Monadology, he follows the hierarchical 
scheme laid out. Bare monads, while representing the entire universe, only contain within 
themselves indistinct perceptions. While these monads are endowed with some limited 
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mentality they lack any higher-order mental properties that we associate with 
consciousness or mind. The informational content of these monads have no self-reflexive 
awareness, nor memory; their transition functions are executed by blind, rote, mathematical 
algorithms
238
. These bare monads are members of organized collections which form living 
organisms, performing as subprograms under a dominant soul monad, and are the 
governing entelechies of living and non-living things in the world. 
Animals are those living organisms whose dominant entelechy can be called a ‘soul’ or 
‘anima’. They are capable of more distinct perceptions, corresponding with their body, and 
have the capacity for memory. Steinhart defines memory in mathematical and 
computational terms, as a sort of ‘consecutiveness’ of the mental phenomena of an 
animal
239
. He describes memory as a mathematical pattern in which the intensity, 
frequency and regularity of repetition of the perception of stimuli on the body affect how 
strongly associations are made in the ‘soul’ of an animal240. As such, the capacity for 
memory necessarily requires the consecutiveness of previous internal states. Even while 
unconscious and operating on the level of that of a bare monad, each given internal state of 
a soul-endowed monad is a function of all of its previous states
241. Steinhart’s use of the 
phrase “information presupposes information” captures his view that the internal states of 
all monads contain informational content. The movement from unconscious to conscious is 
then understood at the “reflexivity of the recursive operation of the monad”242. That is to 
say, the capacity for consciousness arises out of an ensouled monad’s ability to make 
associations through retention of sequenced information about its previous internal states. 
This is made possible since the recursive structure of any given monad’s program is a 
function of all of the monad’s previous internal states. The operations of this function can 
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then be understood as mathematical patterns which represent the unity of the effects of the 
body to those of the soul
243
. 
At the highest tier are spirit monads (human beings) which possess all the capacities of 
more simple monads, as well as the ability to engage in self-reflexive acts that give rise to 
our faculty of reason and access to eternal truths
244. What Leibniz called ‘apperception’, 
Steinhart describes as a special sort of program able to determine its own algorithm and 
data structures
245
. In doing so, we are then able to make computational models of ourselves 
through the rational reflection with our internal state contents
246
. It is important to note here 
that not all of the operations of human beings occur at this spirit level. While the dominant 
entelechy of our being is at the spirit level, that is simply the type of monadic program 
which unifies an innumerable number of perceptions and governs the coordinated 
structures and changes of all other monads which make up the human being. Most of our 
daily activities function on the level of a soul monad, as “empirical physicians” rather than 
at the level of reason
247
. Indeed, as our living bodies are composed of an innumerably large 
number of monads in their complex coordinated relations, most of our functioning is 
comprised of these unconscious computational changes in our petite perceptions. The 
dominant program of the spirit monad is simply that which possesses apperception and 
which unifies the coordinated computational processes and informational content of 
immensely complex monadic relations that make up the living body of human beings. 
Steinhart takes care to highlight that the relationship between the mind and the body is 
not one of efficient causation since there is no intersubstantial interaction as such. 
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“The body does not cause effects in the mind during perception, nor does the 
mind cause effects in the body during action. Rather, both perception and action 
are (inverse) isomorphisms between body and mind.”248 
 
The operations of monads are what give rise to all mental and physical phenomena 
within the spatio-temporal “virtual” world. And since monads are self-sufficient in the 
sense that they alone are the cause of their internal states (via their transition function), 
there is no true communication between monads, except as their formal relations already 
contained within each monad’s complete concept. As such, the appearance of causal 
relations in the phenomenal world is strictly that, of an appearance. While each monad 
corresponds with a material body in the phenomenal world, and is the source of its 
existence, the body is simply an expression of these complex monadic relations, and has no 
substantial realty in and of itself
249
. So there can be no interaction as such between mind 
and body; rather, they are coordinated by the pre-established harmony, through which a 
soul, or mind, and an organic body can be said to be in mutual conformity
250
.  As Steinhart 
explains further: 
 
“The mind is a cellular automaton whose states are just these formal mental 
structures. Both states and transitions of the mental automaton correspond to those 
of the bodily automaton. This is the pre-established harmony between body and 
mind. Mind and body are coordinated, but they do not interact.”251 
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Thus the relationship between the mind and the body, particularly the brain, is one of 
perfect mutual coordination. The occurrence of a bodily sensation such as pain can be 
described as the change of the informational content in the formal structure (the program) 
whose states correspond to the states of the nervous system
252
. The visual experience of 
seeing involves an intentional ‘object’ which corresponds to a complex pattern of impulses 
within the nervous system
253
. In this framework, the complex computational features of the 
mind are not determined by physical brain structures and their electrical and chemical 
processes. Mind is not reduced to the mechanical operations of matter; but nor can mind 
‘act on’ the body in anything other than a purely formal sense. The dominant program of 
the mind can only be said to control its body insofar as the subprograms it governs are 
coordinated in such a way that they can be said to ‘be acted upon’. This activity and 
passivity is programmed into each monad’s transition function from the moment of their 
creation as per the pre-established harmony. 
 
 
8. The Broader Picture 
 
In this section I’ve examined two theorists that have used Leibniz’s Monadology to 
support their computational metaphysical schemes. This is not an exhaustive list of the 
themes and arguments for computational monadology, but these two thinkers, Steinhart and 
Uchii, represent clearly the strong relationship between the original work of Leibniz and 
the push towards rethinking our understanding of the material world. Each offers their own 
information-computational approach to the original work, but adhere to much of Leibniz’s 
dominant principles. Their views are in keeping with interpretation of Leibniz’s monads in 
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terms of computational programs. In the Monadology descriptions such as the fundamental 
units of reality being “incorporeal automata” has enabled his peculiar metaphysical scheme 
to be taken up by current theorists, not just in philosophy but in physics also. 
By using a computational framework, they have established a metaphysical picture of 
the world in which the divide between non-living physical systems and living organisms is 
not of a different kind. Emergence of life is better understood as arising from complex 
systems whose most fundamental units can be said to have life-like qualities. And the 
divide between unconscious processes and conscious, even rational, organisms is simply a 
difference in degrees, not in kind. By describing these fundamental units of reality as 
necessarily endowed with some, limited, mentality, we then reduce the explanatory gap for 
the emergence of consciousness from seemingly unthinking, material systems. And by 
thinking of the entire world as the product of a cosmic computer, we can better situate a 
computational theory of mind which is not reduced to the structures and operations of the 
brain.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
Conclusion: A Leibnizian Computational Theory of Mind 
 
Throughout this thesis I have explored the movement away from materialist systems in 
which the world is explained in mechanical terms of matter and motion. The development 
of classical physics is one in which the explanations of physical structures and systems are 
devoid of the mental properties that we associate with mind. They are blind, mechanical 
systems, composed of interacting parts which obey physical laws. The traditional ideas in 
computational theory of mind rests on those physicalist assumptions; that the mind is 
analogous to a computer whose operations are governed by physical brain structures and 
their interacting parts. However, this view of consciousness is problematic in accounting 
for exactly how consciousness, embedded with meaningful experience, can emerge from 
such physical systems. 
In the advancement of theoretical physics, however, there is a movement away from 
this standard mechanical model. The theories that I have explored in this thesis focus 
primarily on the exploration of computational metaphysics as a new paradigm through 
which we can understand the natural world. In this, I see Leibniz’s role as crucial for this 
new development, and I have focused on the works of theorists like Steinhart and Uchii 
who have based their computational metaphysics scheme using an interpretational analysis 
of the Monadology. Such interpretations of the ultimate nature of reality as information-
computational are not without its difficulties. Strict adherence to Leibniz’s Monadology 
would cause contradictions with contemporary scientific theories; most notably regarding 
the ‘finite nature hypothesis’ and whether or not his infinite plurality is even possible. 
However I find that these reinterpretations of this text, which predates modern field theory 
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and quantum physics, may provide us with a more comprehensive account for both physical 
and mental phenomena. 
 
In describing their ‘computational monadology’, Steinhart and Uchii view Leibniz’s 
monads as computational programs, whose coordinated executions produce space, time, 
matter and motion. Monads are not in space or time, rather these structures, in which 
physical objects exist, are the products of coordinated monadic programs. The whole 
universe can be conceived of as a cosmic computer, the result of an innumerable number of 
these programs computing their own individual algorithms. A crucial feature of this 
interpretation is the role of information. Both Steinhart and Uchii preserve the Leibnizian 
notion of perception in monads. That each computable monad contains within it a 
representation of the entire universe from its own unique point of view, albeit one which is 
mostly indistinct and confused. This presents the idea of panexperientialism; that, at the 
level of reality, the ultimate units of reality are endowed with some mental-like qualities. 
The perceptions of these fundamental units, which represent their proximate monadic 
relations, are the informational content of the universe, from each possible unique 
perspective. And the changes in this informational content occur through the computational 
processes of the state-transition function in each monad. Just as all physical phenomena is 
the result of monadic encoding, as is all mental phenomena. 
As such, there is no ontological distinction between non-living systems and living 
organisms, both are the products of monadic programs, differing only in their complexity. 
The emergence of life does not develop out of ‘inanimate’ physical matter, but rather 
through the same complex, dynamical, computational processes that underlie all physical 
systems. At the very essence of these computational processes is the informational content 
undergoing those changes. The emergence of properties that we associate with mental 
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phenomena arise from those informational structures and computational processes that 
occur through all of the natural world at the level of these monadic units. 
 
Leibniz’s work laid down the foundation to shift away from the “myth of matter” and 
explore the idea of an immaterial, computational basis for reality; an explanation of space 
and time, motion and matter, and even human consciousness that is compatible with current 
empirical investigations into both physics and neuroscience. By retaining a Leibnizian 
understanding of perception and consciousness, we can form a new computational theory of 
mind in which semantic relations are intrinsic in any system performing computation, 
thereby answering criticisms like those raised by Searle’s Chinese Room thought 
experiment. Mental states and events are then not just the products of blind, rote symbol 
manipulation, governed purely by syntactical rules alone. These processes are embedded 
with some limited degree of mentality at the most fundamental level. Within this idea of the 
universe as a cosmic computer, while the computational processes of the brain and the mind 
do correspond to one another, the occurrence of mental phenomena are not reduced to, nor 
derived from, these physical brain states and operations. Rather, they are both the result of 
the complex computational operations embedded in the most fundamental units of reality. 
 
By resituating a computational theory of mind within a framework of computational 
metaphysics, I hope to bridge the disciplinary gap between philosophy, physics, biology 
and the cognitive sciences. In working to create a unified framework to understand the 
natural world, and thereby granting computational theory of mind its explanatory purchase, 
a computational metaphysics model demonstrates how this might be achieved. Although 
this framework is not without its difficulties, and is not fully developed, the aim of this 
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thesis is to explore the possibilities of a new paradigm shift, and the consequences this 
might have to our understanding of physics, the emergence of life and consciousness. 
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